yes, consciousness is the 'spirit' so to speak

So it looks like we have neatly tied ethics to consciousness, yet in another thread we have failed (so far) to tie consciousness to the material world. It was implied in an objection (by Dan) that talk of immateriality is unwarranted, further implying that all explanation can be satisfactorily performed with reference only to physics or the physical (material) world.

Philosophy is often hindered by a proliferation of terms. We have

1. Physical.

2. Material.

3. Metaphysical.

4. Immaterial.

5. Natural.

6. Supernatural.

Please allow me to describe the terminology of "my system," in the hope that we might avoid some confusion in the future. In my system, all things fall into one of three categories:

1. Physical (space-time-mass-energy).

2. Consciousness (sensation, feeling, direct experience).

3. Ideas (forms, pure structure, shape, number, software, etc.).

In my system, the first two kinds of things have the property of existence. The third (forms) do not exist except as representations by objects in the first two. Thoughts, then consist of physical brain structure/activity plus consciousness that together represent ideas. Unconscious mental activity is, then, purely physical.

Please note that the traditional category "supernatural" does not map into my system.

Comment?

unicorns aren't physical, material, metaphysical, immaterial, natural or supernatural. They are imagined.

God isn't physical, material, metaphysical, immaterial, natural or supernatural. God is imagined.

I am not imagined, I imagine

I also experience a physical world, which is full of material. This world starts at my senses and contains my computer, you, Chucky Cheeze Pizza, the Governator and lots of stuff that I can't see yet because it is beyond the Hubble radius; it is also full of natural-born idiots

Metaphysics is what happened when I was confused about being and stuff, and stared wistfully at the stars while imagining God and unicorns

I assume as true that matter (the brain) is correlated with conscious experience. This means that the structure and evolution of the matter that constitutes my brain is connected to the structure and evolution of my experience.

I also assume that my experience is sensible in terms of 'meaning', or qualitative order.

If I assume that the connection between structure of matter and the structure of mind is limited to an injection from matter into mind (that matter structures mind, but that mind doesn't structure matter) then the ordinary action of matter is alone responsible for the qualitative order of my experience.

The assumption of epiphenomenalism is that the meaningfulness of experience (qualitative order) is a necessary product of material functionality. For, if it were not, then the emergence of a mind capable of meaningful experience would be incredibly improbable. I dismiss this assumption as irrational, equivalent to a scientist inventing 'experimental' data based on what 'should' happen.

I argue that the qualitative sense of an experience results in a 'choice' influence on matter such that the evolution of matter is a function of both physical constraint and the quality of experience.

Very nicely put. You are saying that consciousness is "in the loop" from a sensori-motor viewpoint. That's a robotics concept, except that robotic engineering has no need for a concept of consciousness. So that brings us to the so-called hard problem of consiousness:

"Why should it be that there is something that it is like to exist." That is, what is the reason for consciousness? Why should we have it? Since we can imagine or engineer intelligent systems that are unconscious, why did nature invent it?

Additionally, exactly how this "choice influence on matter" works still needs explaining. So the two open questions about consciousness can be summed up as "why and how." Both of these are as yet not satisfactorily answered by any scientific discipline.

I remember seeing somewhere a philosophical proof that there can't be nothing, but I don't remember how it goes. Mind bogglement and brain rackment are routine states for those who think about these things.

The proposition "there exists a 'qual' for every 'quant'" is a version of panpsychism. To me, it's unsatisfying because it doesn't explain why most complex systems (redwood forest, for example) are not conscious.

Indeed, brain theory is one area of study for roboticists.

My own little hypothesis focuses on memory. It seems that no memory can be formed without first passing through consciousness. Therefore, a possibly testable prediction is that animals that don't learn aren't conscious. How to test it is the problem.

Thinking about analogies of conciousness, I have a suspicion that it is analogous to the shape of our bodies.

Shape
contains all our organs, bones, teeth, skin. And the 'shape' is almost representative of the integration of the body parts. A body has to end up with 'shape' if body parts exists.

Consciousness
memories, thinking, experience, thought, dreams. And 'conciousness' is almost representative of the integration of the mental capabilities. A brain has to end up with 'consciousness' if the mental functions exist.

I know one is of physical being and the other is of mental being in physicsal 'bits', but I see a similarity here.

A big question then, is why do other animals not appear to have conciousness. Is there at least one mental function we have which they don't have?

YES!!!

Humans have the ability to perceive of themselves as seperate from and connected to the universe.

Rick,
I have the greatest respect for all things which are structured or organised in an apparent way, ie., most things occurring in Nature, so I do not presume that animals don't need treating 'humanely'.

Yes, but do you "feel their pain?"

That can help, but I was thinking more along the lines of devising an experiment to establish the existence of your hypothesized 'quals.'

that might be about as easy as Leucippus establishing the existence of the atom

Dan,

LOL...I like your method of awareness...*smiles at ya* you are too clever ya know...

you first?

Well, I'm older.

If quals exist as properties of matter then there should be some way to build a qual detector that is not totally private as our experience of them is.

That is, if nature found utilizing quals in animal guidance systems to be beneficial, then there must be some way of showing that animal guidance systems without quals will not work as well.

Your turn.

I'd like to think that the 'information portals' are atoms, so we would need an atomic-scale circuit with specific 'node' atoms that are connected to sensing and motor equipment (this connection must be very sensitive, so that the S/N ratio greater than unity). Feedback is essential, so that the 'quale-complex'(assuming it exists) can apply selective influence over the configuration of the atomic circuit both internally and with respect to the sensing and motor equipment. We must let it choose what it likes. We'd need to try lots of atomic circuits, with our variables being the type of atoms used, spatial distribution of the atoms, connectivity of the atoms, quantity of atoms, etc... because we are essentially taking random shots and the variety will give us a better chance to succeed.

So how do we know when we succeed?

how do you know that anybody else is conscious?

If you are alone on a desert island 1000 miles from everybody else, you don't know if anyone else is conscious.
True, even if you see an aircraft flying overhead!

I suspect that this 'knowledge' is based on similarities of their behavior to yours. Do you think that there exists some set of behaviors that is characteristic of consciousness? If you were to 'awaken' some assembly of matter into a state capable of conscious interaction with its newly-extended environment, do you think these behaviors would be identifiable?

since I know you programmed it, I can say with confidence that I am seeing the results of your programming rather than the results of a conscious machine. The idea here is that we let the device 'program itself'. We simply set the initial state of the device (build the 'tabula rasa' brain) and let it evolve its own patterns of behavior that are (hopefully) selected by intelligent action.

OK, suppose we succeed in creating a machine that starts out blank and learns like a baby learns. Suppose it has a skin with temperature sensors. Suppose it learns that when its skin gets burnt off, it can be repaired at some expense of time and trouble, so it learns that screaming with pain and pulling its hand out of the fire will decrease the likelihood of damage. Do you think it will actually feel anything? I don't.

calculate the probability of that outcome as a function of ordinary causality (physics). The less probable it is, the more probable the 'consciousness' interpretation

Huh?

the way you described the robot response to heat, it appeared to simply be a highly probable outcome based on the functional utility of avoiding fire. Imagine, instead, that the robot develops a pattern of picking flower petals and tossing them into a river, and when doing this creates strange melodic sound patterns. What would you think of such a robot?

Malfunction, weird programming, or unanticipated consequences of complexity. Consciousness is not algorithmic. Arranging of symbols or structure is content but not substance.

boy, sounds like you've eliminated in principle any logical way for detecting consciousness. Perhaps you can hire a psychic