Firstly, my sincere apologies for the length of this post. I had to deal with a number of quotes in turn, though. Hopefully you'll find it interesting, and the Nietzsche quote both beautiful and illuminating (if not positively enraging).

A synopsis of my position has been put forward, but I think it has flaws. Perhaps I wasn't clear enough. Herewith an argument that attempts to rebut the synopsis' line of argument.
QUOTE(Dan @ Apr 07, 12:59 AM)

ok, a synopsis of Lao's position
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words and concepts can express only conventional truths, but Truth can be apprehended only nonconceptually if at all.
Therefore, 'Truth' is not a concept.
Well, I think that's a serious leap.
A rock - that hard, grey, roundish thing - is not a concept. It's a rock. But as soon as we use the word "rock" to describe that hard, grey, roundish thing, we are using a concept.
It's the same with 'Truth' in this context. The 'Truth' we're trying to talk about surely exists as something that is not a concept. So in that sense Dan is quite correct. Truth is not a concept - it is Truth. But as soon as we talk about it, we are talking about a concept of Truth, and not Truth itself. That's what I mean.
QUOTE(Dan @ Apr 07, 12:59 AM)

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... it means that talking about it is futile, because we must always talk in conventional terms, using concepts.
Therefore, 'Truth' cannot be meaningfully discussed.
Which of course leads me to wonder, How is it that we are having a discussion about Truth here given that we cannot actually have a discussion of Truth here? This seems inconsistent. Perhaps we will uncover this inconsistency.....
We must be very careful, in this discussion, with the words we use, since our discussion is about words. We must also be very careful not to misquote one other.
If you look carefully, I actually said that Truth could not be
meaningfully discussed. I did not say, as Dan suggests, that "we cannot actually have a discussion of Truth here". Obviously, that is not true - we are discussing Truth, however poorly. Now, I should have used a better word, like "accurately" or "fully", but what I mean is that our words about Truth will never attain fully (accurately, meaningfully) to describe Truth, because we must use concepts, which are reductionary.
QUOTE(Dan @ Apr 07, 12:59 AM)

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Conventional truth is certainly useful; it can describe aspects of Truth ...
How is it possible to make meaningful statements about Truth if Truth cannot be meaningfully discussed? You can either discuss Truth or not discuss Truth.
I actually said that "conventional truth can describe
aspects of Truth", but Dan suggested I said it is "possible to make meaningful statements about Truth".
So I was misquoted. But that's irrelevant. Both claims are correct, in a way. This is very tricky. Read on:
Suppose we say "Truth can never be fully described". That statement has conventional meaning, and it's a statement about Truth. However, the statement does not describe Truth completely, it merely points to one aspect of it - the fact that it can't be fully described.
Now, since descriptions of Truth, to be really meaningful, must be complete (because Truth is the whole, and cannot be reduced, except by concepts) the description is not in fact meaningful about Truth itself. The real, nonconceptual Truth is beyond both describability and indescribability - both are extremes, and concepts that fail to obtain to the true nature of reality. (I must hasten to add that the real Truth is also beyond being "beyond both describability and indescribability", and it is beyond "beyond being beyond both describability and indescribability". I hope this gives the reader more insight into what I'm trying to describe.)
So, to the extent that the "indescribability" aspect of Truth - about which the statement is made - is reduced from the totality of Truth (being just one aspect of the whole), what we are talking about is a concept, a reduction, and not the whole Truth. That is why Truth cannot be meaningfully discussed, but it's still possible to make (conventionally) meaningful statements about aspects of it.
QUOTE(Dan @ Apr 07, 12:59 AM)

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in ways that are, strictly speaking, flawed, but still useful.
What is the flaw? That 'Truth' cannot actually be discussed? Isn't this a fatal flaw?
Yes. In the ultimate analysis, it is a fatal flaw. It means that science cannot attain to fully describe Truth, merely conventional truths.
That is my original hypothesis in this topic, so I'm glad Dan agrees. Still open for debate, though, of course...
QUOTE(Dan @ Apr 07, 12:59 AM)

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concepts aren't the only tools we have - we can understand some things experientially, immediately, without recourse to concept.
'Concepts' are higher-order understandings - models if you will. Ultimately they are based on 'experiential' understandings. Think of them as shortcuts. If the 'experiential' understandings on which they are constructed are sound, then the concepts are sound. Their meaning lies in the 'experiential understanding' out of which they are constructed. Perhaps some people do not have the 'experiential understandings' on which the concepts are based. These people then do not understand the concepts. That is the problem with concepts.
I don't entirely agree with this. But it's a complex argument, so I'll refer you to Nietzsche, in "On Truth And Lies in a Non-Moral Sense". I apologise sincerely for the length (and the bold text is my own) but it's probably some of the more beautiful philosophy-poetry I've ever come across.
In particular, let us further consider the formation of concepts. Every word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual original experience to which it owes its origin; but rather, a word becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases--which means, purely and simply, cases which are never equal and thus altogether unequal. Every concept arises from the equation of unequal things. Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is certain that the concept "leaf" is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects. This awakens the idea that, in addition to the leaves, there exists in nature the "leaf": the original model according to which all the leaves were perhaps woven, sketched, measured, colored, curled, and painted--but by incompetent hands, so that no specimen has turned out to be a correct, trustworthy, and faithful likeness of the original model. We call a person "honest," and then we ask "why has he behaved so honestly today?" Our usual answer is, "on account of his honesty." Honesty! This in turn means that the leaf is the cause of the leaves. We know nothing whatsoever about an essential quality called "honesty"; but we do know of countless individualized and consequently unequal actions which we equate by omitting the aspects in which they are unequal and which we now designate as "honest" actions. Finally we formulate from them a qualities occulta which has the name "honesty." We obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and actual; whereas nature is acquainted with no forms and no concepts, and likewise with no species, but only with an X which remains inaccessible and undefinable for us. For even our contrast between individual and species is something anthropomorphic and does not originate in the essence of things; although we should not presume to claim that this contrast does not correspond o the essence of things: that would of course be a dogmatic assertion and, as such, would be just as indemonstrable as its opposite.
What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and; anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions - they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.
We still do not yet know where the drive for truth comes from. For so far we have heard only of the duty which society imposes in order to exist: to be truthful means to employ the usual metaphors. Thus, to express it morally, this is the duty to lie according to a fixed convention, to lie with the herd and in a manner binding upon everyone. Now man of course forgets that this is the way things stand for him. Thus he lies in the manner indicated, unconsciously and in accordance with habits which are centuries old; and precisely by means of this unconsciousness and forgetfulness he arrives at his sense of truth. From the sense that one is obliged to designate one thing as "red," another as "cold," and a third as "mute," there arises a moral impulse in regard to truth. The venerability, reliability, and utility of truth is something which a person demonstrates for himself from the contrast with the liar, whom no one trusts and everyone excludes. As a "rational" being, he now places his behavior under the control of abstractions. He will no longer tolerate being carried away by sudden impressions, by intuitions. First he universalizes all these impressions into less colorful, cooler concepts, so that he can entrust the guidance of his life and conduct to them. Everything which distinguishes man from the animals depends upon this ability to volatilize perceptual metaphors in a schema, and thus to dissolve an image into a concept. For something is possible in the realm of these schemata which could never be achieved with the vivid first impressions: the construction of a pyramidal order according to castes and degrees, the creation of a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations, and clearly marked boundaries-a new world, one which now confronts that other vivid world of first impressions as more solid, more universal, better known, and more human than the immediately perceived world, and thus as the regulative and imperative world. Whereas each perceptual metaphor is individual and without equals and is therefore able to elude all classification, the great edifice of concepts displays the rigid regularity of a Roman columbarium and exhales in logic that strength and coolness which is characteristic of mathematics. Anyone who has felt this cool breath [of logic] will hardly believe that even the concept-which is as bony, foursquare, and transposable as a die-is nevertheless merely the residue of a metaphor, and that the illusion which is involved in the artistic transference of a nerve stimulus into images is, if not the mother, then the grandmother of every single concept. But in this conceptual crap game "truth" means using every die in the designated manner, counting its spots accurately, fashioning the right categories, and never violating the order of caste and class rank. Just as the Romans and Etruscans cut up the heavens with rigid mathematical lines and confined a god within each of the spaces thereby delimited, as within a templum, so every people has a similarly mathematically divided conceptual heaven above themselves and henceforth thinks that truth demands that each conceptual god be sought only within his own sphere. Here one may certainly admire man as a mighty genius of construction, who succeeds in piling an infinitely complicated dome of concepts upon an unstable foundation, and, as it were, on running water. Of course, in order to be supported by such a foundation, his construction must be like one constructed of spiders' webs: delicate enough to be carried along by the waves, strong enough not to be blown apart by every wind. As a genius of construction man raises himself far above the bee in the following way: whereas the bee builds with wax that he gathers from nature, man builds with the far more delicate conceptual material which he first has to manufacture from himself. In this he is greatly to be admired, but not on account of his drive for truth or for pure knowledge of things. When someone hides something behind a bush and looks for it again in the same place and finds it there as well, there is not much to praise in such seeking and finding. Yet this is how matters stand regarding seeking and finding "truth" within the realm of reason. If I make up the definition of a mammal, and then, after inspecting a camel, declare "look, a mammal' I have indeed brought a truth to light in this way, but it is a truth of limited value. That is to say, it is a thoroughly anthropomorphic truth which contains not a single point which would be "true in itself" or really and universally valid apart from man. At bottom, what the investigator of such truths is seeking is only the metamorphosis of the world into man. He strives to understand the world as something analogous to man, and at best he achieves by his struggles the feeling of assimilation. Similar to the way in which astrologers considered the stars to be in man 's service and connected with his happiness and sorrow, such an investigator considers the entire universe in connection with man: the entire universe as the infinitely fractured echo of one original sound-man; the entire universe as the infinitely multiplied copy of one original picture-man. His method is to treat man as the measure of all things, but in doing so he again proceeds from the error of believing that he has these things [which he intends to measure] immediately before him as mere objects. He forgets that the original perceptual metaphors are metaphors and takes them to be the things themselves.
QUOTE(Dan @ Apr 07, 12:59 AM)

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When we realise that our thoughts, being linear and one-at-a-time, are useless fully to describe and understand the universe, which is multidimensional and all-at-once, we must search for other tools than thoughts to use.
How can we realize this without thinking? Sounds like a 'belief' to me. I suppose that such a belief is what makes a system like Buddhism work in the mind of the neophyte, seeing as how the neophyte lacks understanding of the problem that the system (such as Buddhism) appears to solve.
We do not, as has been suggested above, "realize this without thinking". This is a demonstrative example of a way in which linear thought is useful: among other things, it reveals its own ultimate futility. We realise this by thinking. And of course, yes, it is a belief.
I don't quite understand what is meant by the sentence about Buddhism and the neophyte, though. But that's not really on the topic. I'm interested though, so please send me a personal message if you want to discuss it further...
QUOTE(Dan @ Apr 07, 12:59 AM)

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Yeah, the monologue on Truth is futile - but only insofar as our conventional discussion can't attain to describe Truth. It's still conventionally useful
So a monologue on Truth is both futile and 'conventionally' useful?
Exactly! Because, as Nietzsche points out above, conventional truth is merely a socially agreed-upon frame of communication, which has no desire really to investigate truth. This is suggested from the following analysis:
Towards those truths that are beneficial to us, we are positively inclined. Towards those truths that are neither beneficial nor hostile to us, we are neutrally inclined or indifferent. And towards those truths that are harmful to us or bring a fatality to us, we are even hostilely inclined! This is therefore not a search for truth, which would disregard that causes of those truths and accept both 'harmful' and 'beneficial' truths equally - it is a quest for convenience. We designate as "truth" and "falsehoood" not what are actually true and false, but what are useful for us to accept or reject as a society.
The usefulness of the monologue about Truth is a conventional one. And since convention is not about truth but convenience, the monologue (if it is searching for Truth) is futile.
QUOTE(Dan @ Apr 07, 12:59 AM)

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We can still accurately describe the futility of the attempt, since 'futility' is a conventionally agreed thing and so can be conventionally discussed.
so, if 'futility' is a 'conventional truth', how can the claim "attempts to describe Truth are futile" be meaningful in terms of the reality of Truth? Isn't this just another conventional statement that, by your definition, cannot attain to describe Truth? Doesn't it then follow that this statement contradicts itself?
Well, "futility" is not about Truth, but about an attempt; an attempt to describe Truth. The attempt is a conventional concept, and applies only to our concept of Truth, and not to Truth itself, to which none of our concepts apply.
But you are quite correct. The claim "attempts to describe Truth are futile" is not meaningful in terms of the reality of Truth. Truth admits no futility, nor any opposites of futility - it transcends both concepts.
You are quite correct - this is just another conventional statement that, by [my] definition, cannot attain to describe Truth.
You are quite correct - this statement contradicts itself. But in doing so, it proves itself.
"The opposite of a correct statement is a false statement. But the opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound truth."
- Niels Bohr
QUOTE(Dan @ Apr 07, 12:59 AM)

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it is useful to know in conventional terms that conventional approaches to Truth are futile, because that finding directs those of us who're frustrated with the apparent limitations of conceptual thought to investigate nonconceptual means, like meditation.
Now this is interesting. I posit that this statement accurately represents how you made the 'leap' to mystical thought as the only approach to understanding 'Truth'. The key here is that you have 'found' the 'truth' that conventional approaches to Truth are futile (a belief). This belief allows you to reject any statements of 'truth' in your quest to understand 'Truth', but, interestingly, it does not lead you to reject the 'truth' that caused the belief. hmmm.....
Well, I accept your idea, but I think it is wrong. The basic problem is in the first sentence. I actually made the leap to mystical thought not through thought, but through psychedelics.

Thank goodness for that.
Besides, I don't reject statements of "truth" out of hand. I'm quite attached to them, otherwise I wouldn't have made this bloody massive post... I just keep their limits in mind. I accept them as "truths" but not as "Truth". Useful for conventional discussion, but almost useless for realising the mystery of the universe.