KARL JASPERS FORUM
TARGET ARTICLE 50
NATURE’S SELF-CREATION
AND MIND AS A NATURAL EVENT
by Ronald Swan
17 February 2002, posted 7 May 2002
ABSTRACT
A hypothesis is presented that resolves the long-standing fracture between physical and mental phenomena in the scientific tradition and situates mind as a natural possibility. The hypothesis is "meta-scientific" in that it does not resolve issues unique to any specific discipline and is formalized using elementary mathematical logic. However, it is falsifiable within standard scientific method because it implies empirical properties that can be determined consistent or inconsistent with current knowledge and supported or invalidated by future discovery. For example, the hypothesis predicts general properties of nature that are consistent with specific features of relativity and quantum mechanics, but not classical physics. Further, it predicts that the general theory of every scientific domain will have a non-computable basis.
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The premise of this paper is that a complete, empirically supportable theory of mind requires that the possibility of mind be fundamental, even obvious, within our basic ideas about nature. Mind can be neither a "separate reality" beside the physical nor an epiphenomenon subordinate to the physical. If mind is separate, how does it connect to the physical ? And if it does connect, in what sense is it separate ? If mind is subordinate, how does it achieve effective causal control over the physical organism by "purposive, goal directed behavior" and "acts of will" ? Is "downward causality" a theoretical contradiction ?
[2]
Brash, drastic, and downright unbelievable as it may sound, my "claim" is that there is a secular meta-scientific hypothesis of nature that situates all empirical phenomena such as wave-particle duality, non-locality, relativity, life, mind, sociological and cultural processes as natural possibilities, and explains why nature exists. The hypothesis has specific empirical predictions by which it can be supported or invalidated, as opposed to descriptive analysis that is solely intellectually persuasive. And there is the caveat that the price paid for obtaining an explanation across the complete range of nature’s event classes is not getting a specific theory that uniquely explains phenomena within any particular domain of study (such as physics, biology, or cognitive science). That is, it implies no concrete theory about the structure of elementary particles or the engineering of the brain.
[3]
The fundamental technical idea of the hypothesis is the non-computable fixed point concept implied by Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems. The fixed point concept is the formal representation of an empirical model implying that both local and non-local properties are fundamental conditions of actual existence at all levels of the natural hierarchy (elementary particles to mind). The hypothesis ("a meta-scientific theory of nature" or MSTN.0) assumes that identity preservation is a general common property of all actual entities. Identity preservation is a boundary condition within an environment. MSTN.0 treats the boundary condition (entity or process) as part of the (its own) environment. If we consider a "location" or event to entail specific space-time locality, then identity preservation is necessarily non-local to the extent it comprises a pattern over an event class (multiple locations).
[4]
If we accept the implication that space-time location is not a reified "enclosure" (container) for events, then local-non-local properties, space-time location and "non-location," and the event itself are identical. Every identity preserving entity (process, event class) is both definite and indefinite. Hence, actuality is both causal and non-causal (determinate and indeterminate). That is, the properties that have been both theoretically defining and intellectually mysterious at the quantum level are conditions of identity (being actual) at every level. Specifically, mind is a non-local property of the brain. "Acts of will" ("I am now going to pick up this fork and start eating") and "goal directed behavior" are non-causal events just as the EPR phenomena of physics are non-local and unexplainable within the bounds of relativistic causality.
[5]
It is not necessary to seek a complete explanation of the possibility of mind at the level of quantum mechanics because locality and non-locality are also properties of identity preserving processes at the level of organisms. This conclusion does not mean that the engineering of the brain is not dependent on quantum level non-locality to generate "mind." It does mean that non-locality as mind is distinct from quantum non-locality in the same way a living organism as a total boundary condition (process) is distinct from the physiological, electrical and chemical processes it depends on.
[6]
MSTN.0 implies that a complete theory of any natural domain containing identity preserving processes must have a non-computable basis. Hence, the hypothesis can be falsified by the discovery of a comparable computably based theory. A corollary is that mind also has a non-computable basis. Thus, MSTN.0 can be falsified by the creation of an entity with the full properties of mind or conscious awareness based entirely on computable procedures equivalent to a Turing machine (no matter how complex).
[7]
Recall that classical mechanics has no explanation for the equivalence of inertial and gravitational mass whereas the equivalence is intrinsic in relativity. Analogously, in the meta-theory MSTN.0, the following concepts represent intrinsically equivalent perspectives on an underlying empirical and foundational property of nature: local-non-local, causal-non-causal, determinate-indeterminate, definite-indefinite, different-identical. This equivalence solves the fracture of nature into physical, living, and mental phenomena. More pictorially, identity preserving processes are the possibility of nature having no a priori, independent, or fixed basis. "Natural law" is a practical approximation to reality just as classical gravitational "action at a distance" is to the contiguous relativistic non-Euclidean model. [A complete exposition of MSTN.0 would contain the following: (1) Local existence implies non-local existence as an empirical application of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems. (2) Non-local existence implies local existence as an empirical application of elementary model theory. (3) The possibility of the physical-life-mind hierarchy is an empirical application of (1) and (2) as modeled in the theory of the higher infinite. This paper deals with part (1).] {Elements of a Meta-Scientific Theory of Nature}
BACKGROUND AND CONCEPT
[8]
A common complaint regarding modern science and scholarship is that the extreme level of specialization makes it hard to envision broad issues, connections, and solutions. Of course, the positive side is that many of the major triumphs of 20th century science and technology, such as medical advances, the new computer age, the beginning of high-level genetic science, and space exploration, would not be possible without specialization. The negative extreme is the modern equivalent of scholastic arguments about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
[9]
My interest is in the middle area: significant issues that have either been ignored as intractable to scientific method or where many attempts at resolution have been made but the intellectual community has remained divided on the correct approach with no commonly acceptable solution in sight. There have been several critical periods in the history of science where investigation regarding anomalous results has seemingly ground to a productive halt. Before the theory that the earth is the center of the universe fizzled, there were numerous attempts to explain peculiarities of planetary motion by adding epicycles to their orbits. Similarly, before Newton’s universal theory of motion and gravitation, there were pieces of loosely connected knowledge regarding the relationship of motion, matter, and energy. Before Darwin, there was the need to presume an independent force to explain life, whether a divine designer or a secular Lamarckian drive toward improvement. Following the Michelson-Morley experiments, physicists unsuccessfully attempted to fit the equations of relativistic motion into a satisfactory theory until Einstein was bold enough to overturn commonly held assumptions.
[10]
I am suggesting both that we are now in such a situation and that by changing basic assumptions about nature we can resolve deep, centuries long questions. Brilliant people have provided extensive analysis and valuable proposals regarding the issues of mind and intelligence (for example, Chalmers, Hofstadter, Lucas, Penrose). Nevertheless, there is no commonly accepted, empirically validated theory of mind. I believe that investigating the problem under two distinct levels or issues is most productive. There is the engineering or technological problem in the theoretical context of all relevant disciplines (physics, chemistry, biology, cognitive science, AI) regarding how an entity with the property "mind" can function or be made. In addition, there is the generalized problem of how it is possible for mind to be a naturally occurring phenomenon. That is, rather than being a "paste on" epiphenomenon (epicycle) of nature requiring contortions of explanation, why shouldn’t mind be an innate and fundamental, even obvious possibility? But the history of science is an irrefutable demonstration that our existing ideas about nature as a whole do not hold a direct, integrated, logical solution to the problem of the natural possibility of mind. I am proposing that radical alteration of our most basic assumptions about nature (as a totality) can provide a solution that places the possibility of mind directly within the natural world, and, further, that such a radical solution is the only adequate one.
[11]
The scientific "revolutions" referred to above have at the least a common analogical thread of letting go various intellectual supports based on religious belief or current common sense to allow specific aspects of nature to "stand on their own." With biological evolution we let go an external creator or some type of arbitrary and unseen life force. With relativity we abandon the ability to make physical measurements with reference to anything beyond the actual physical entities being measured and doing the measuring. In each case, it was necessary to make a difficult leap of imagination and alter basic insight regarding how those aspects of nature work. Clearly, such radical changes in what is assumed about nature have not come easily either to society or the scientific community.
[12]
I am claiming that if we identify exactly what "the support that we keep letting go" is at the most general and abstract level logically possible, and then take the bold and difficult step of determining the empirical consequences, a new major "revolution" in our understanding of nature is possible. Corollary claims include that (1) the consequent hypothesis can be given formal representation using elementary concepts of mathematical logic; (2) since we are "releasing" the ultimate possible support, we will receive the most general level of explanation; (3) the level of explanation will be what has formerly been considered philosophical or theological (as opposed to currently investigated scientific domains); and (4), the empirical consequences will constitute an in-principle test of validity that places the hypothesis within the standard of scientific method.
[13]
The theory of evolution may provide the closest analogy. Pre-Darwin there is no credible, fully scientific explanation for the existence and development of life. Based on pre-Darwinian assumptions, even the most scientifically acceptable theories contain arbitrary "oracular" elements that cannot be empirically resolved within the standards of scientific method. However, biological evolution is a complete, empirically testable theory over its domain. There is no condition with reference to the existence of living organisms to which "random variation and natural selection" does not apply as a general process. Although notably, it cannot be generally represented as a computable procedure. That is, "random variation and natural selection" neither is nor leads to an effective procedure for predicting the concrete form of organisms in a future environment based on their form within the current environment.
[14]
Looking back retrospectively, the root ideas of major advances in scientific knowledge seem elegantly basic, even simple. In addition to ideas introduced in classical physics, evolution, and relativity, quantum theory changes our conception of matter and energy from continuous processes to discontinuous packets having dual particle-wave properties. Even though these concepts seem to conflict with common sense, are impossible to fully visualize, and require advanced mathematics to rigorously formulate, they are not fundamentally complex. Just so, the root idea of the new hypothesis is simple even though it requires radical alteration of our common notion about the what-and-why of being "real."
[15]
The "bold and imaginative leap" required to achieve the new revolution in our view of nature is to abstract from the upper hierarchical level to obtain the general hypothesis. Even a "Theory of Everything" that unifies the domain of physics would not generate an empirical theory of nature as a totality. No matter how necessary understanding the processes occurring among fundamental particles is to understanding the function of the brain, the content of biological, mental, and sociological processes will require separate levels of investigation and theory. Hence, a true empirical hypothesis regarding nature as a whole must identify explanatory properties that apply to all hierarchical levels.
[16]
Science has spent centuries idealizing the computably representable natural law discovered in the lower hierarchical levels and attempting to find equally strong computable representability in the upper hierarchy. The inability of sociology to find strong computable representation of social event classes exemplifies an essential limitation (for example, applying survey research methods to predicting election results achieves relatively ephemeral success compared to the highly accurate long range predictions of motion required for space travel). Strong computability requires a stable field of background circumstances.
[17]
Consider that as in the life sciences, event class invariance ("natural law") in the physical sciences is not absolute but occurs only relative to an assumed stability of environmental conditions. Again, in the general case, there must be properties common to every domain of nature. The "radical new assumption" of the revolutionary hypothesis is that the central property is a generalization of the strong circumstantiality of the upper hierarchy. As in evolutionary biology, the idea of the new assumption is quite simple. We can describe it by defining existence as solely "reflexively" or "unconditionally" circumstantial. In the case of organisms, it means that the organism is an active circumstance of its own existence and that the total circumstances {are} its existence. (We use the dictionary meaning of {reflexive} as "directed back on itself." Hence, if x is an "identity preserving process" [neutron, plant], although locally x = x is an "internal, external" boundary condition, non-locally x = x is the identity of entity and circumstances [environment]. Compare this seemingly contradictory duality to quantum wave-particle duality, as a specific instance.) An objective of this paper is to make local-non-local duality at all levels of the natural hierarchy feel as obvious and reasonable as biological "random variation and natural selection." (And thereby, completely demystify and secularize biology-based phenomena including "being alive" and performing "acts of will.")
[18]
The extreme contrast we can visualize is between the purely mechanistic "billiard ball" externally causal determinism of classical mechanics and the existence of an organism. An organism is completely constituted as the existence of a boundary interaction of internal and external circumstances. Total circumstantial dependency means simply that there is no independent guarantee (beyond the actual internal and external circumstances) of an organism coming into, sustaining, or ceasing existence at any level or by any means. The key idea is the elimination of any reification whatsoever regarding an organism as an actual entity that can be referred to, analyzed, or objectified apart from or in addition to its total concrete circumstances. Then, we generalize this idea to all existence, and follow the logical consequences to the full empirical conclusion, no matter what. We can pictorially visualize nature as a spectrum of causal conditions from completely external and mechanical (an idealized Turing machine or mechanical device, macroscopic energy-motion processes) to internal-external reflexively circumstantial and boundary preserving (elementary particles, organisms) to the totality of nature defined as that unique entity boundary condition) where internal and external circumstances are identical ("absolutely" non-local).
[19]
The critical intuitive insight can be further isolated by attempting separation of nature into two objects: the actual processes of nature, or "events" (compare the relativistic interpretation that the space-time continuum consists of events as 4-dimensional space-time locations), and the invariant patterns found across event classes ("laws"). Next, there is the distinction between law as (1) a real object existing in "Platonic space" that provides ideal form or control for concrete events, (2) a purely abstract object (mental construct or formal representation) that describes invariant, but non-reflexive, fixed patterns in concrete events, and (3) a purely abstract object representing invariance in reflexive, circumstantially embedded event classes. We need to be convinced that (a) there is no functional difference between (1) and (2), and no observable means by which to determine such. This (Aristotelian) conclusion is evident because both interpretations are represented in any given case by the same ideas or mathematical formulas and the only observables are the actual and identical events being represented. (

The difference between the first two and (3) is observable because distinguishable empirical consequences of the versions of causation are identifiable. Hence, we require existing and in-principle empirical tests to determine if (3) is the more adequate explanation of nature’s general causal properties.
[20]
Some examples may make the range and meaning of this distinction clear.
(1) Newton’s universal laws of motion and energy apply to all "real" entities and describe the necessary and fully deterministic physical behavior of all entities. Unfortunately, the assumption that these laws are literally universal creates an immediate and unbridgeable gap between "physical" and "mental." Although the classical equations can predict the motion and energy properties of macroscopic objects with high precision, neither these nor any other deterministic equations can be expected to predict the "purposeful" behavioral physical motion and effects of living entities. The equations that predict the movements of space vehicles and orbital location of planetary objects to seemingly incredible levels of accuracy do not predict the detailed decision process of minds building and launching the vehicles. In addition, our hypothesis implies that no computable procedure whatsoever can provide a complete representation of the purposeful behavior of living organisms (as opposed to mimicking or imitating partial features). Hence, with respect to the classical theory, since biological and mental event classes remain unexplained, their classification as completely "real" comes into question. The logical alternatives are to either classify them as secondary epiphenomena of physical nature (that which we {are} able to explain), or make them into a separate category of nature for "living" entities. Therein is the split between physical and mental. Current physical theories of physics and chemistry have not resolved this gap.
(2) The equations of the theory of relativity are also fully deterministic and (by our hypothesis) provide no explanatory basis for purposeful behavior. For our purpose, the significant difference between the classical and relativistic theories is in the "frame of reference" assumptions. We will consider the concept of "fixed point" as a means of generalizing the meaning of frame of reference. The velocity of light is a pivotal difference. The classical theory allows the assumption that light propagates in a medium (ether) that is fixed for (exists independently of) all observers, similar to sound in air. Hence, the measured velocity should vary depending on the relative velocities of the observers with respect to the medium and each other (otherwise, it would not be possible to pass the sound barrier). The medium was assumed to provide the universal frame of reference, or fixed point. When experimental evidence failed to support the variability of the velocity of light, Einstein introduced the radical, non-intuitive assumption that the measured velocity itself constitutes a quantitative fixed point for all observers regardless of relative motion. By drawing out the mathematical consequences of the new fixed point assumption, Einstein found seemingly uncommon sense conclusions that would provide empirical tests for the new theory.
(3) Unlike relativity, which has computable deterministic laws that are predictive at the event level, quantum theory does not have event level computable representability. For example, particle emissions from radioactive isotopes are not individually predictable. And yet, the "pre-collapse" wave equation is fully determined. It is well known that relativity and quantum mechanics have not yet been integrated into a unified and complete theory over the domain of physics. We will choose the identity preserving properties of elementary physical entities as the focus of our fixed point investigation. The conclusion to be reached is that computably representable event classes do not have strong identity preservation, and strong identity preservation is not computably representable. Even "in-principle," unlike the classical theory, computable representability of the actualized events is only possible as a probability condition based on an assumed environmental stability.