False Distinctions, Fallacy and Terminological Crisis in Contemporary Consciousness Studies


By Steven Ericsson Zenith at June 9, 2004 12:45 AM.

In this paper we confront a crisis in contemporary consciousness studies.

The literature of prominant contemporary authors contain false distinctions, tautology and uncertain terminology. Speculation founded in this language has led the authors to make flawed logical arguments.

We highlight instances of the problem in the work of opposing contemporary philosophers David Chalmers and Daniel Dennett. We also identify general issues and propose solutions.

We look at the following arguments presented by Chalmers.

- By Chalmers' definition a reductive theory is necessarily a physical theory. We ask, what constitutes a reductive theory?
- Many authors, including Chalmers, have asked, what is physical and where does one draw the line? We ask, is there a line to be drawn?
- Chalmer's defines a non-reductive theory as one in which the subject is primitive. We ask the obvious consequence, can a reductive theory be one that excludes a primitive?

We examine the following tautologies in Chalmers and in related work.

- What is the conscious mind? We ask, is there any other kind of mind?
- What is conscious experience? We ask, is there any other kind of experience?

Finally we review current usage of the notions of possibility and necessity in consciousness studies. Chalmers adheres to a notion of logical possibility. We ask what is logical about logical possibility? Dennett claims that what is possible is whatever isn't necessarily not the case? We ask the obvious consequence: Are those things necessarily the case, merely possible? Must we accept all the things we cannot decide as possible?

Many authors have asserted that the mind is the product of ontological emergence. We ask, what the notion of ontological emergence contributes to the debate and is it simply platitude?

Are these merely questions of terminology and sentence structure, or is there a genuine cause for concern?

We argue that the criticism cannot be easily dismissed and that sufficient objective evidence exists that provides a cause for concern. Contemporary arguments are confused and do not meet past standards. They threaten the serious consideration of the subject in our generation. And, these shaky philosophical foundations are leading the contemporary scientific endeavor astray.


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Well,... looks hopeful!!