The structure that defines the mind undoubtedly is the brain, and the brain is a distributed information network. What I am talking about is the subjective sense of mind, which is unitary (the 'whole' exixts as a single perceived state). How do you think a disjoint collection of matter might lead to a unitary subjective state? Do you even understand the problem?

but one of the keys involves characterizing that 'integration' and better defining the 'self'.

yes. Maybe it has to do with our percepts of "disjoint collections of matter" which in reality are not so disjoint. Besides wholeness, we'd need to account for the apparent individuality of consciousness. How comes about the ego and why does it fool itself, assuming it fools itself?

this sounds like a wonderful discussion in itself. Do you have any ideas on this 'matter'?

I'm not sure what you mean here; can you rephrase?

Individuality of consciousness, in the sense of experiencing individuality, versus universality and identity of consciousness, in the sense of experiencing universality and identity.

That is, do you experience your individuality, or your universality, or both, or something else? Do you experience yourself as an individual defined (and confined) by your ego, or do you experience yourself beyond ego, to universal consciousness and universal mind?

Have you not experienced anything other than your individuality and ego? If so, then what was it?

It all comes to the universanl mind, my friend.

Alex
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http://www.biofeedbackzone.com
http://www.biofeedbackzone.net

No, no, no. Taking your motherboard/pc analogy, the brain (or more accurately, the entire nervous system) is the motherboard of the body. The mind is the software, not the hardware, even though the hardware constrains the software. The hard drive is just where memory is located, and you might be tempted to compare this with the hippocampus in the brain (though it should be noted that the hippocampus seems involved in the transition of short-term memory to long-term, and not with memory storage per se). The soul equivalent to a modem is silly because a modem is just one channel (of many possible channels) enabling the exchange of information. As such, a modem might be comparable to the sensory organs of the body (i.e., retina, skin, cochlea). The soul might be comparable to digital logic (or computation), or in other words, digital logic and computation are the soul of a computer.

DNA handles that quite nicely.

Or are you suggesting the brain reprograms our DNA?

well what i don't get is that we must have a conscious in order to survive, since we are conscious beings, so if our conscious does not exist in our brains then where the hell does it exist?

Universe exists in consciousness!

'where' is a form of consciousness, so there is no 'where' that consciousness exists.

that makes sense to you?

then the 'observer' exists, right?

topologically speaking, yes.

There are no distance measures in topology. There are only connectivities. Introducing a distance metric transforms topology into geometry. But distance is only imposed by consciousness; it is an illusion. Connectivities may also be an illusion, but it's difficult to imagine anything better. Maybe binary logic. You know, 'It from bit'.

It is consciousness, which gives 'existence' to anything, including itself.
Without consciousness, everything is reduced to mere mathematical probability, with no existence.

Everything exists in the same consciousness where you exist.

There will be instances when two persons share the same experience or thought.

If everything is shared then there will be no individuality.
It is our ability to keep some experience/thought private, gives us the individuality.
Imagine what would happen, if you suddenly start sharing everyones experiences and thoughts.

I do not exist in consciousness, I am conscious. This is the key. Consciousness is not a place that contains me, rather it is my awareness-of. If my awareness-of is the only field of objective existence, they you are simply a figment of my imagination (or vice versa, if you are the 'real' one )

If consciousness both exists and has no 'place', then it is logically equivalent to say it is 'everywhere'. If consciousness is both 'private' and 'everywhere', then there can be no other consciousness.

Maybe we should think in terms of a 'raster' man who cycles through all available conscious states in a temporally serial fashion (time-division-multiplexing of consciousness into a finite number of disjoint histories). This is logically consistent with the above two boundary conditions (private and everywhere) while not logically excluding either the appearance of simultaneously existing multiple nodes of private consciousness external to oneself(a primitive belief of all of us) or the animation of these nodes by 'first person' (that's you, bud). This lonely
'raster' man would be constantly cycling through various disjoint conscious states that are each dominated by a small subset of structure (i.e., a particular 'brain'). During the moment that a particular 'brain' dominates consciousness, consciousness is filled with the perception of a world from the perpective of this brain (a consequence of structure, with the 'brain' subset of structure dominating), seeing an 'outside' full of 'stuff' both inanimate and animate. This lonely 'raster' man gets the bonus of interacting with animate stuff (others) that are in fact animated by himself although this is unbeknownst to him. Ignorance of the reality that the 'others' are really just faces of himself allows him to believe that he is not alone and that there are, in fact, 'others'. Perhaps this is the primary redeeming feature of this otherwise painful construct that renders it ultimately worthwhile.

The only problem that I see with this 'raster' concept is that of continuity: I sense that I am continuously Dan. Is this sense an illusion? Am I continuously Dan, or not? If I am only intermittently Dan, perhaps during the fleeting moment when I am Dan I cannot recall being anything other than Dan and also I have no sense that I was, just an instant before, not Dan. I would then feel that I have always been Dan and have not been anything other than Dan, during the moment that I am Dan.

I am either aware of something or I am not. I cannot simultaneously be aware of something and not be aware of something.

It all depends on what you mean by "aware of their experience".

The question arising is one of COMMON experience.
You are comparing an actual experience with another persons imagination of what that experience was.
In that case, your statement is correct, but 'aware' is a bad choice of word.
The statement should perhaps be rephrased by 'just because you cannot see what someone sees does not mean your not capable of imagining their experience'.

Your existing statement implies that two people 'share' or 'have' exactly the same thoughts, feelings, and experience, when in fact they cannot do so!

I, almost, agree with you!

But,
It is the "awareness-of" with no identity(with no objects of awareness) is the 'real' ONE. Both Me and You are just objects of awareness, and our "self" is the "awareness-of".

Your "awareness-of" is same as my "awareness-of".
In normal state of mind, this "awareness-of" is filled with "objects of awareness".
Since the objects are separate it appears that the "awareness-of" is separate.

When we have clear state of mind, there will be more "awareness-of" and less objects of awareness. Oneness will be felt(realized), in such a state of mind.



We do not seem to be aware of our subconscious mind, though it is within our awareness. There is some mechanism, which selectively highlights only some area of the awareness. It is this spot light mechanism, which we mistake for the awareness. (Figuratively, The flash of the spot light appear to dampen the rest of the awareness.)

I am not an object of perception, I perceive objects. I am not an object in 'awareness-of', I am aware of being Dan in the World (and not aware of being Rajesh in the World).

What do you think of my 'time-division' hypothesis?