I find the following analogy helpful for thinking about consciousness. Has anyone seen anything similar?

Thanks,
Victor C. te Zinnen


In the below, I give an analogy that (in my mind) illustrates some issues in the philosophy of mind, including
the explanatory gap, qualia, the problem of other minds, etc.

Imagine we come upon a computer that is running a simulation. Specifically, the computer is simulating a world much like our own,
with its own laws of physics, and advanced biological creatures much like ourselves. On the monitor and through the speakers,
the computer is displaying the perspective of one of these creatures. Let us use the name "C" to refer to this distinguished
creature. We may or may not be able to affect C's actions using the keyboard and mouse, but for simplicity, let us say that we are
not able to do so; all we can do is watch, seeing through C's eyes and listening through C's ears.

If we watch the simulation long enough (and if C takes interesting enough actions in the simulated world -- for example, looking
through a microscope), we may obtain a very good idea of the laws of physics in this world. Let us make an extreme assumption
and suppose that we come to completely understand these laws; moreover let us assume that we completely understand what the initial
state of the simulated world was. In a sense, we now understand a large part of the source code for the simulation program:
the part that concerns the physics of the world. This code could have been written in different ways, but these ways would all
be equivalent in terms of the effect that they produce. But this cannot be all the code; there must be some additional
code that regulates the display of C's senses to us. This is the part of the code that makes C the "distinguished" creature.
It is also the part that, for example, determines which part of the simulated world's light spectrum to display to us in red
(the physics of the world would have remained unaffected if it had displayed this to us in blue instead).

It is conceivable that C is not as distinguished as it seems to us. For example, the computer may in fact be connected to many
other computers, each of which displays the perspective of a different creature in the simulation. (In addition, perhaps the different computers
display different times within the simulation, so that not even the current time in the simulation is distinguished.) The
computers may also choose different ways of displaying the simulation, with one choosing to use red where the other uses blue.
Nevertheless, this does not affect the argument that the code that deals with the physics of the world cannot be the entire
source code: there must still be additional code that regulates which creature's perspective (at which time in the simulation)
is displayed on which machine, and how this perspective is displayed.

I imagine that little in the above argument is in and of itself controversial. What is undoubtedly controversial is whether the above
situation is similar to our own life. Is my perspective, at this point in time, in any sense "distinguished"? Is there some
metaphysical source code that is regulating this distinction? Certainly, the laws of physics as we know them do not seem to explain such
a distinction. Also, do the laws of physics fail to explain "what it is like" to see red, and if so, is there some additional
metaphysical source code that determines this?

Incidentally, it seems that some religions may be trying to make the same point.

I believe I once read something like the following in a book about Zen Buddhism (though now I can't find a reference anymore -- does anyone know a reference?):

"In all of Indra's net, one pearl alights."

(Indra's net is a net of pearls/jewels, each one of which represents a life form or unit of consciousness, and each reflects all others.) It seems that this "alighting" of one pearl may correspond to one particular "consciousness" being distinguished -- the "active" consciousness, which is being "displayed".

Perhaps even the biblical "I am that I am" (the name that God gives Moses when the latter asks him for his name) is related to this -- perhaps the idea is that God is what makes the experience of "I" come alive, distinguishing one creature at one point in time.

In any case, hopefully the analogy can stand on its own even without reference to ancient texts. I prefer the more rigorous approach of philosophy of mind.