Divine Attributes of God Options

[Unknown]

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

Classical theism is found in the Greeks since Plato; in the Judaism of Philo, Maimonides, and others; in Christian orthodoxy generally, and in Islam as early as al-Kindi. Discussions of God in classical theism have centered on a number of specific attributes. The working assumption from the Greeks onward has been that God is the most perfect possible being. There is an implicit question as to whether perfections are coherent such that they can exist in one person. If they are not, God would have all perfections possible for a single being. In more theologically oriented thinkers, the assumption that God is a perfect being serves not to formulate the concept of God but only to fill in what is given in revelation. The Reformers, for example, depended heavily on revelation because of their conviction that the human mind is darkened by corruption and therefore is inadequate to shape concepts of God.



1. Incorporeality. God has no body (from Latin, incorporale), or is non-physical. This is a central tenet of monotheistic religions, which insist that any references to God's eyes, ears, mind, and the like are anthropomorphic. Christian belief in the incarnation is a unique case in which God takes on human form in Christ.

While some regard God's incorporeality as true analytically (that is, true by the very definition of the word "God"), others derive it from one or more other attributes. Accordingly, God cannot be corporeal because that would preclude his being eternal, immutable, and simple, for example. Furthermore, if God were corporeal and omnipresent, it would seem that all physical things would be part of God. Others derive divine incorporeality from an apparent incorporeal element of human nature, termed the soul or spirit.



2. Simplicity. God has no parts or real distinctions. The neo-Platonist Plotinus regarded God as therefore characterless, but Christianity generally recognizes the legitimacy of talk of attributes. For Aquinas, to be simple God must be (among other things) incorporeal as well as identical to his nature, not a member of a class that shares a common nature. Aquinas said that God has the perfections we ascribe to him, but that they exist in him in an incomprehensible unity such that we cannot understand the reality behind our statements. When we ascribe goodness to God, goodness does not mean exactly what it does when we ascribe it to a creature (univocal meaning), nor does it mean something entirely different (eqivocal meaning). Its meaning is analogical: in some sense the same and in some sense different. Maimonides insisted on equivocal meaning only, with the result that negative attributes alone can be ascribed to God. Yet he recognized that even negative attribution gives some understanding of the divine being. In Islam, most philosophers (such as al-Farabi) accepted divine simplicity, whereas most theologians rejected it. Some used it to reject the Trinity. Augustine had recognized a potential conflict between simplicity and the Trinity, but believed the resolution lay in proper understanding of the Trinity.



3. Unity. Monotheism maintains that there is one God. To this Christianity adds that there is a threefold distinction within one God. Stated roughly, God is one substance in three persons. Aquinas argued that there cannot be two gods because neither would be absolutely perfect since one would have a quality that the other lacked (Summa Theologica Ia, 11, 3). Richard Swinburne says that theism is a simpler hypothesis than polytheism, the latter positing more beings with various capabilities and relations. Theism is therefore more likely since simpler hypotheses turn out to be true more often. Moreover, the universe exhibits a unity, in its universal natural laws for example. This unity argues for one deity as its originator (The Existence of God, 1991, pp. 141-2).



4. Eternity. Biblical authors spoke of God remembering the past, knowing the future, and acting in the present. According to early Christian thought, God exists forever, without beginning or end. For him events are past, present, and future. Later Christian thought, under the influence of Platonism it is said, held that God exists not inside time, but outside it. God is atemporal in that for him everything is simultaneous, there being no past, present, or future. This later view was held by Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas; and classically expressed by Boethius, "Eternity is the complete and total possession of unending life all at once" (Consolation of Philosophy, V, vi). Boethius regarded a timeless being as superior because it does not lack a past and future; its entire existence is in a timeless present.

In modern times the timeless view has been defended by E. L. Mascall, Norman Kretzmann, Eleanor Stump, Paul Helm, and Brian Leftow. Arguments in favor include: it makes God more transcendent, it simplifies foreknowledge, it proposes the same divine relationship to time as to space--God is outside it; furthermore it allows for the creation of time along with matter. Arguments for the earlier view, that God is eternal but exists within time, include: personhood requires existence in time because only in time can there be intending, acting, knowing, remembering, and the like; it is difficult to explain how a timeless God can know or respond to events; and the notion of timeless eternity is incoherent.



5. Immutability. Those who accept the view that God is outside time are able to argue that God cannot change because any change would have to take place inside time. The view that God is an absolutely perfect being can also lead to the conclusion that he cannot change: if he is perfect he could change neither for the better nor for the worse. Simplicity can be grounds for accepting divine immutability since the only things subject to change are things with parts. Immutability has been taken in a strong sense to mean that if a predicate p applies to God at any time then it must apply at every time. But this is so broad that it brings into the discussion of immutability things that, while changing, are in no way changing within God. For example, "Smith believes in God" could be false yesterday and true today, yet nothing within God has changed. God is immutable in a weaker and less problematic sense if it is required only that he does not change in his character and purpose. The weaker sense fits well with the view that God exists in time, since he could be considered immutable yet begin an action, forgive a person, and so on. Thus, predicates like, "God is protecting r from harm" could be the case at one time but not another and God would still be immutable. The stronger sense of immutability fits well with a God outside of time.



6. Omnipotence. The claim that God can do anything has been the subject of a number of qualifications. First, many affirm the biblical view that God cannot do what is morally contrary to his nature. Similar to Anselm (Proslogion 7), Aquinas says that God cannot sin because he is omnipotent, since sin is a falling short of perfection (Summa Theologica, Ia.25.3). Nelson Pike says that it is logically possible for God to sin but he would not do what is against his nature. Aquinas also says that God cannot do other things that corporeal beings can do. And, he cannot do what is logically impossible, such as make a square circle. Descartes is one of the few to hold the contrary view, that the laws of mathematics and logic are subject to the will of God (Descartes' Conversation with Burman, 22, 90). Perhaps the most significant challenge to omnipotence involves the existence of evil. It seems evil would not exist if God is both good and omnipotent. Process theology denies omnipotence, Christian Science denies the ultimate reality of evil, and some post-Holocaust thinking seems to question the goodness of God. Augustine defends the orthodox Christian concept of God on grounds that he did what was good in creating free beings yet they used their freedom to do evil. Some suffering is the just consequence of sin. Furthermore, where evil is a lack of good we cannot ask why God created it since it is merely the absence of something. Aquinas, Leibniz and others recognize that some good things exist only in the presence of certain types of evil. For example, forgiveness exists only where there is sin. In the light of these secondary goods, Leibniz argues that out of all the possible worlds God created the one with the best possible balance of good and evil. Some thinkers appeal to a future life to settle apparent discrepancies in the balance of good over evil. God's future blessing, it is said, can more than make up for suffering in this world. William Alston develops the idea that as limited beings we are incapable of discerning-and therefore questioning-whether God has sufficient reasons for allowing the evil that exists.



7. Omniscience. While a few like Avicenna and Averroes seem to have held that a God who lacks certain types of knowledge would be more perfect, most have claimed that God knows everything. This is sometimes refined, for example, to the claim that God knows everything that is logically possible to know. An area of concern going back to Aristotle (On Interpretation 9) is the claim that propositions about future contingent events (i.e., those whose causes are not determined by past events) have no truth value. If so they are unknowable, even by an omniscient being (a view held in modern times by so called Open Theism). Some have claimed that even if future events have a truth value, they are logically unknowable. Of special concern is the relationship between omniscience and human free will: if yesterday God knew infallibly that I would do x today, it seems I have no alternative but to do x today--a conclusion that seems to violate free will. To solve this, Boethius and Aquinas appealed to the concept of God's timelessness, which entails that none of God's knowledge is past or future. Aquinas also said that God determines all events and determines that they will be done freely. De Molina objected that this amounts to removing free will. He constructed his own view, which said that God's knowledge is logically prior to his decree of what will be. God knows what an individual will do in all possible circumstances (a capacity called middle knowledge), and he decrees those circumstances in which a person freely cooperates with the divine plan. Thus foreknowledge is compatible with free will. Others have conceded that foreknowledge is incompatible with free will but claim that God voluntarily limits his knowledge of future events so that there can still be freedom. This makes omniscience a matter of having an ability to know rather than having specific knowledge. Another solution to the problem of omniscience and freedom challenges the idea that God's knowledge limits future free actions in any way. While God knows necessarily that I will do x tomorrow that does not entail that it is necessary I do x. What God knows is what I will freely choose to do. So God knows today that I will do x tomorrow because tomorrow I will freely choose to do x. But if tomorrow I choose to do y, then today God knows that tomorrow I will do y. This view is consistent with what we know about less than infallible knowledge of future events. I may know that a person will choose steak over bologna though I in no way influenced their choice.



8. Impassibility. Various views have been held as to whether God can be affected by outside influences. Because Aristotle regarded change as inconsistent with perfection, he concluded that God could not be affected by anything outside himself. Furthermore, God engages not in feeling, but thinking, and he himself is the object of his contemplation. God is thus unaffected by the world in any way. The Stoics ruled out divine passibility because they regarded imperturbability as a virtue, and God must be the supreme example of it. John of Damascus agreed that God is imperturbable, but stressed it is because he is sovereign, not because he is uncaring. Aquinas accepted Aristotle's view that God cannot change and is impassible. He can act, but nothing can act upon him. So emotions that proceed from God, such as love and joy, are in God; but other emotions such as anger and sadness can be ascribed to him only metaphorically. Early, medieval, and Reformation Christianity generally affirmed that because God could not suffer, Christ suffered in his humanity but not in his divine nature. However, the idea that God is unaffected by the world is being rethought in modern times. Moltmann, who was for a time a German prisoner of war, and Kitamori, a Japanese thinker, both witnessed World War II and its aftermath. They concluded that God must be moved by suffering. Richard Creel defends impassibility as being uncontrolled by outside influences. He says, among other things, that: God has emotions but they are not controlled by anything outside himself, he takes into account the ultimate good that will come from suffering, suffering does not make love more admirable, a God who suffers would be more appropriately an object of pity than of worship, justice does not require passibility because it need not be based on emotion; and omniscience does not require passibility because God need know only that a person has an emotion, he does not need to experience it. A mediating position would allow emotion in God but not control of him in any way by creatures. God would be affected by the world but only in the way and to the extent he allows.



9. Goodness. Whereas classical Greek religion ascribed to the gods very human foibles, theism from Plato onward has affirmed that God is purely good and could not be the author of anything evil (Republic). In Judaism divine goodness is thought to be manifested especially in the giving of the law (Torah). In Islam it is thought to be manifested in divine revelation of truth through the prophets, especially as revealed in the Qur'an. And in Christianity it is manifested in the gracious granting of Christ as the way of salvation.

While goodness encompasses all moral perfection (e.g., truth telling, justice), benevolence is that particular aspect of goodness that wills the benefit of another. The Reformers, and Protestantism generally, stressed that God's desire for the benefit of creatures is dependent not on their merits but purely on divine love. Divine love is not only irrespective of merit but it is shown most clearly where it is entirely unmerited, as in grace shown to fallen humanity. Therefore divine forgiveness and redemption are taken as the highest expressions of benevolence. Benevolence intersects with omnipotence in providence, wherein God orders events for good ends. It also raises the possibility of a clash between the divine and human wills, as when a person spurns God's action in the world.

Divine goodness raises the question of whether God wills x because it is good, or x is good because God wills it. The former seems to weaken divine sovereignty, but the latter seems to make goodness arbitrary. The arbitrariness may be somewhat relieved if God's will is understood as bounded by his unchanging character. God would not, for example, decide to make torturing for enjoyment right since his nature forever condemns it. The issue has implications for divine command ethics, according to which acts are right or wrong because God commands or forbids them (as opposed to, for example, a competing view that acts are right or wrong according to whether they promote the greatest happiness).

As to our knowledge of divine goodness, Aquinas separates the order of being from the order of knowing: all goodness derives from God but we understand divine goodness by extrapolating from the goodness of creatures. For Aquinas, this requires an analogical (as opposed to an equivocal) relationship between divine and human goodness. For Kant, divine goodness is known as a postulate of pure practical reason: God must be there to reward virtue and punish evil.

The greatest challenge to belief in divine goodness has been the fact that evil exists, or more recently, the amount and type of evil rather than the mere fact of it. The problem is lessened if it is acknowledged that divine goodness does not require that each creature always be made to experience as much happiness as it is capable of experiencing. Reasons may include, for example, that: it is impossible that all creatures collectively experience maximal happiness (e.g., because the maximal happiness of one precludes the maximal happiness of another), or that there is some higher good than the happiness of all creatures (e.g., John Hick's view that maturity is that higher good, and acquiring it may entail some displeasure), or that some forms of good are manifested only when certain types of evil exist (for example, forgiveness requires wrongdoing; mentioned in "6," above); or because God's favor is undeserved and not given in response to merit, it cannot be owed and God cannot be faulted for not giving it.

[Lindsay]

The following "questions", IMO, are rhetorical ones--the kind I try to avoid.

I didn't know there was any good ones. What makes them good/bad? How can you tell them apart? By the size of their building, or the number of conquered souls?

So are the following--ones I also try to avoid: How come some people are so cynical that they do not even recognize when they are being cynical?
How come some people have no idea how to carry on a civil dialogue which could lead to real information and progress? How come some people are more inclined to be aggressive than progressive?

Questions for information, asked with respect:
Are you an atheist?
How do you define atheism? Theism? Deism?
Religion? Theology? Science? Pneumatology?
In what "religion", if any, were you raised?
Are you cynical about all religions? If not, what value do
some of them have?
Keep in mind: I love dialoguing with people who agree differ, to disagree, agreeably.
=====================================================
BTW, did I ever call anyone "gullible, etc ..." or even implied that they were? Offer one quote of mine, in proper context, where I called anyone, foolish and gullible, or even ignorant, and I will gladly apologize. IMO, ignorance, is not a problem. I am ignorant of many things. As I said, "ignorance is curable".

I also readily admit that there are certain kinds of people with whom I find it very difficult to dialogue so I do come to the point where, for the benefit of all, I refuse to do so.

[code buttons]

If I sound cynical, Lindsay, it might be out of frustration. Because I realize that I am wasting my time with you like I’d be if I was talking to a brick wall. As for religion, I stated my opinion earlier in this thread. But, overall, this is how I feel about your questions: Religions are misleading and evil. They have no place in our rational society except for the ignorant and the gullible (but, if ignorance is curable as you claim, then there is hope for humanity; and that's a good thing). It’s like a social cancer that spreads from brain to brain. And the process repeats itself at an exponential rate. This process is counter-productive to social advancement and progress, but it goes on unchecked, nonetheless. As far as the end result of the social degradation by way of religion, one needs to look no further than the current state of world affairs: Muslims killing Christians killing Hindus killing Muslims and so on…
I’m a simple man and as such, keep it simple: If and when in doubt, I use reason and love to guide it (Rick’s original, by the way)

[Lindsay]

...I’m a simple man and as such, keep it simple: If and when in doubt, I use reason and love to guide it (Rick’s original, by the way)

If this is how you live your life then let's face it: this is your RELIGION, which literally means way of life. I too believe in reason, guided by love and consider them part of any healthy religion.

It is no accident that John's writings define GOD as love. Jesus said, "GOD is spirit" and that we ought to love one another. He, as did Paul, spoke of love as the highest good. Our word 'spirit' comes from the Latin 'spirito'. It literally means air, wind or breath, which to the ancients were looked on as the mysterious source of life itself. The Greek is 'pneuma'; the Hebrew is 'ruach' and the arabic is 'ruh'. I think of myself as one with GOD with every breath I take. IMO so is everyone. I like to write GØD so as to get away from the idea of thinking of divine being as an object, a male or female person. It helps me avoid what is called anthropomorphism--creating GØD in our human image.

Interestingly, Jesus never said, "GOD is a Christian" or "a Jew". In my opinion, he advocated Spirituanity, not Christianity. So do I. This does not require my belonging to a powerful, organized, and dogmatic group church. I accept it that, as Lord Acton (1834-1902) warned, "Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely" http://www.libertystory.net/LSTHINKACTON.html
Interestingly, Acton was a Roman Catholic, and he had no formal education.

If you know anything about history: There was such a thing as the Reformation of Roman Catholicism.

Out of the Reformation came numerous smaller fellowships. I like what can happen in small fellowship groups. Like enlarged families they can be designed to help people take care of and serve one another, lovingly.

BTW, you write: "As far as the end result of the social degradation by way of religion, one needs to look no further than the current state of world affairs: Muslims killing Christians killing Hindus killing Muslims and so on…"

Surely you are not arguing that scientific and materialistic humanism is the root of all virtue and good, are you? I am sure that you must be aware that atheistic regimes such as those of Stalin, Mao and others did their share of killing, are you not? Sick atheisms and sick religions do exist.

Meanwhile, keep in mind that the root meaning of the word 'devil'--from the Greek diabolos--is, that which divides, or separates, us from our good. The same is true of the the Hebrew 'satan' and the Arabic 'shatan'. One of the reasons that I am a strong advocate that people ought to be free to disagree, agreeably is that I feel that unnecessary divisiveness is fraught with danger and borders on stupidity.

[code buttons]

I too believe in reason, guided by love and consider them part of any healthy religion.

Now, who is being the cynical here?

...GØD spoke to me and told me bla, bla,bla... Jesus said in the Bible bla, bla, bla... I like to dialogue with others about the son of GØD, bla, bla, bla...

Need I say more? Lindsays diagnosis: Delusional beyond help. What a doofus! You're not just embarrassing yourself, you know! Wollowed up in the arrogance of your ignorance. What else did "the son of god" say? might as well quote the whole thing here at BrainMeta,since you like to share your "good news" so much. Start a new thread under "Ancient Astrology" if you would, though; I wouldn't want the average Joe to be decieved. At least not here at BM.

[Lindsay]

...Need I say more?

More what? Spinning and diatribe? If this is your choice, go ahead. However, expect me to respond only to dialogue.

[Culture]

...Need I say more?

More what? Spinning and diatribe? If this is your choice, go ahead. However, expect me to respond only to dialogue.

Seems that this dialogue is going nowhere. I am not rying to step on anyones toes here, but perhaps this will help taking this discussion to another level.

This should be of interest not only to academics but to all who wish to dialogue in a rational manner. I generally give this to my first year university students on day one.

http://www.ukpoliticsmisc.org.uk/usenet_ev...e/argument.html

The Fallibility Principle
The Truth-Seeking Principle
The Clarity Principle
The Burden of Proof Principle
The Principle of Charity
The Relevance Principle
The Acceptability Principle
The Sufficiency Principle
The Rebuttal Principle
The Resolution Principle
The Suspension of Judgment Principle
The Reconsideration Principle

1. The Fallibility Principle

When alternative positions on any disputed issue are under review, each
participant in the discussion should acknowledge that possibly none of
the positions presented is deserving of acceptance and that, at best,
only one of them is true or the most defensible position. Therefore, it
is possible that thorough examination of the issue will reveal that
one’s own initial position is a false or indefensible one.

2. The Truth-Seeking Principle

Each participant should be committed to the task of earnestly searching
for the truth or at least the most defensible position on the issue at
stake. Therefore, one should be willing to examine alternative positions
seriously, look for insights in the positions of others, and allow other
participants to present arguments for or raise objections to any
position held with regard to any disputed issue.

3. The Clarity Principle

The formulations of all positions, defences, and attacks should be free
of any kind of linguistic confusion and clearly separated from other
positions and issues.

4. The Burden of Proof Principle

The burden of proof for any position usually rests on the participant
who sets forth the position. If and when an opponent asks, the proponent
should provide an argument for that position.

5. The Principle of Charity

If a participant’s argument is reformulated by an opponent, it should be
expressed in the strongest possible version that is consistent with the
original intention of the arguer. If there is any question about that
intention or about implicit parts of the argument, the arguer should be
given the benefit of any doubt in the reformulation.

‘For a practical application of the principles governing good
argumentation summarized in this chapter and addressed throughout the
book, see the detailed critique of several popular points of view,
including those of Shirley MacLaine and Ronald Reagan, in Lawrence L.
Habermehl’s The Counterfeit Wisdom of Shallow Minds: A Critique of Some
Leading Offenders of the 1980’s (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.,
1995).

6. The Relevance Principle

One who presents an argument for or against a position should attempt to
set forth only reasons that are directly related to the merit of the
position at issue.

7. The Acceptability Principle

One who presents an argument for or against a position should attempt to
use reasons that are mutually acceptable to the participants and that
meet standard criteria of acceptability.

8. The Sufficiency Principle

One who presents an argument for or against a position should attempt to
provide reasons that are sufficient in number, kind, and weight to
support the acceptance of the conclusion.

9. The Rebuttal Principle

One who presents an argument for or against a position should attempt to
provide an effective rebuttal to all serious challenges to the argument
or the position it supports and to the strongest argument on the other
side of the issue.

10. The Resolution Principle

An issue should be considered resolved if the proponent for one of the
alternative positions successfully defends that position by presenting
an argument that uses relevant and acceptable premises that together
provide sufficient grounds to support the conclusion and provides an
effective rebuttal to all serious challenges to the argument or position
at issue. Unless one can demonstrate that these conditions have not been
met, one should accept the conclusion of the successful argument and
consider the issue, for all practical purposes, to be settled. In the
absence of a successful argument for any of the alternative positions,
one is obligated to accept the position that is supported by the best of
the good arguments presented.

11. The Suspension of Judgment Principle

If no position comes close to being successfully defended, or if two or
more positions seem to be defended with equal strength, one should, in
most cases, suspend judgment about the issue. If practical
considerations seem to require an immediate decision, one should weigh
the relative risks of gain or loss connected with the consequences of
suspending judgment and decide the issue on those grounds.

12. The Reconsideration Principle

If a successful or at least good argument for a position is subsequently
found by any participant to be flawed in a way that raises new doubts
about the merit of that position, one is obligated to reopen the issue
for further consideration and resolution.

From Attacking Faulty Reasoning by T. Edward Damer