There is no free will Options

[Hey Hey]

The whole point of our species is to raise the average IQ/Knowledge to the highest pinacle of our societies, thereby giving us a collective intelligence way higher than today and allowing us more minds and "processing" power to increase the speed of breakthroughs.

Is intelligence additive? I can see that higher levels of understanding would enable us to get over the barriers to the comprehension of extremely complex phenomena, but is a collective intelligence possible, as this is not necessarily the same thing as a collective consciousness? (Of course, increased knowledge/memory can easily be accommodated in the future by a flashable chip, or maybe by access to the memory of others, or their flashable chip, but this is not intelligence). I suppose there are so many facets of intelligence that access to ones are limited in individuals would be beneficial. But simple access in a collective consciousness is not the same thing as a shared/combined intelligence.

Continuing AND back to the point of the topic. If we became a collective consciousness, would we retain free will (if we had it in the first place)?

[trojan_libido]

I see I mixed two concepts together and your right to point it out. The combined knowledge only raises the platform of understanding, not the intelligence of our race. Intelligence probably increases due to the cultural pressures put on the biology. Therefore as we raise our average knowledge, we also create the external pressures on our bodies to adapt. That same recursive loop that many have spoken of in this and other topics.

I think we will always have the perception of free will.

[Jellybean2]

eh?

Well if you believe in the bible the clear and obvious answer would be correct--free will is non-existant. I actually believe in hard determinism myself but for other reasons...

actually no.. i believe the Bible.. and it is clear about God giving us a free will.... He has always given us the option to believe in Him or Not.

[lucid_dream]

Can anyone provide a rigorous definition of "free will"? Anyone?

[Joesus]

Rigorous meaning you can please all of the people all of the time rigorous?

[Culture]

Can anyone provide a rigorous definition of "free will"? Anyone?

If the alleged concept of "free will" is mysterious or inexplicable, why would you desire a definition of it?


What I find noteworthy about this terribly belabored topic is that no one ever considers the implications of a stalemate. Rather, each side prepares more evidence and thought experiments and hypotheses and all manner of sophisticated jargon with the sole purpose of propounding irrefragable evidence that the opposition's tenets have been quashed

"Free will" to the classic compatibilist means simply being able (ie physically unconstrained by outside forces) to do what one wishes/wills/wants to do. It is thus very different to the kind of free will that the metaphysical libertarian seeks (ie the idea of free agency and ultimate responsibility). The compatibilist notion of free will assumes neither determinism nor indeterminism and is quite at home with either concept (in contrast to the hard determinist who denies indeterminism, and the libertarian who denies hard determinism).

However, I suggest that even hard determinists believe in free will of the compatibilist kind.

[Technologist]

Of course. They just refuse to call it free will.

[maximus242]

Most of the arguments against free will have to do with neuroscience and the predictability of the human brain. Right now, as we speak, scientists are building software to predict how human neurons fire.

In other words, it will be possible for them to know what your going to say - before you say it and what your going to do before you do it.

You could quite possibly sum up the human brain in a mathematical algorithm, although it would be very, very long. So you see, when people can predict your actions in advance of them actually happening, you begin to look more like a machine than a "person" as we know it.

The debate about free will has been heavily debated and no definite answer has been reached.

[lucid_dream]

Max, chaotic systems will probably always be beyond the reach of complete predictability since you need infinite precision to model them and make predictions. This means that neural systems will very likely never be completely predictable (since they are chaotic systems).

Being inclined towards determinism since indeterminism usually implies ignorance of causes or in some cases, a giving up on trying to find the causes of things (i.e., by rationalizing that things are 'really' indeterministic or random, or simply the 'Will of God' without further inquiring into cause-effect relationships), I have nonetheless come across useful definitions of 'free will', or more precisely, 'freedom', in the deterministic sense, as the definition supplied by Spinoza. We are 'free' to the extent that we are the cause of our actions, and since we live in a completely deterministic universe, all of our causes are intertwined with others in a complex web of causality, where nothing is left to chance. Is this incompatible with quantum mechanics? No, though some might say that it depends on whether you accept the Copenhagen interpretation, where even though the evolution of the wavefunction is purely deterministic, the collapse results in a random selection of particle values, or Bohm's interpretation, where everything is deterministic, but at the expense of locality of interactions.

To make any sense of the world, it is necessary to adopt a deterministic worldview. People may disagree with me here, but I would justify it pragmatically; namely, that it is useful to believe that everything has causes and is deterministic because that opens the door for determining what those causes are and for further understanding, prediction, and control; the hallmarks of science. Thus, to speak of 'free will', I can accept no less than a deterministic definition for it, since anything else is likely a simple parroting of what others have told them (such as, 'free will' is the human freedom to choose), often employing definitions that are circular, inconsistent, vague, or otherwise unsatisfactory.

Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that deterministic definitions of 'free will', which I would subscribe to, are rather disingenuous since the term is usually understood by other people to mean some mysterious human freedom to make choices that apparently is not determined by prior causes; hence, confusion is wont to arise in any discussion of 'free will'. However, by being precise in what we are talking about, it is possible to avoid this, and so my question above, about what precisely is 'free will', was meant to bring a quick resolution to this unnecessarily messy topic.

[Technologist]

Lucid, I agree word for word with what you've said.

Especially:

I have nonetheless come across useful definitions of 'free will', or more precisely, 'freedom', in the deterministic sense, as the definition supplied by Spinoza. We are 'free' to the extent that we are the cause of our actions, and since we live in a completely deterministic universe, all of our causes are intertwined with others in a complex web of causality

and

Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that deterministic definitions of 'free will', which I would subscribe to, are rather disingenuous since the term is usually understood by other people to mean some mysterious human freedom to make choices that apparently is not determined by prior causes; hence, confusion is wont to arise in any discussion of 'free will'. However, by being precise in what we are talking about, it is possible to avoid this

[Technologist]

For some reason I am reminded of the serenity prayer my mother would recite when I was a child:

God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change,
the courage to change the things I can change,
and the wisdom to know the difference.

Of course, I believe that these virtues (serenity, courage and wisdom) can be self-manifested rather than bestowed “from on high�, but the underlying sentiments are apropos for this discussion.

[Technologist]

And I couldn't resist at least one Nietzsche reference for this dialog...

The thought of eternal recurrence

The thought of eternal recurrence is central to the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. As Heidegger pointed out, Nietzsche never speaks about the reality of "eternal recurrence" itself, but about the "thought of eternal recurrence." Nietzsche conceived of the idea as a simple "hypothesis", which, like the idea of Hell in Christianity, did not need to be true in order to have real effects. The thought of eternal recurrence appears in a few parts of his works, in particular §125 and 341 of The Gay Science and then in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. It is also noted for the first time in his posthumous fragment of 1881 (11 [143]). The experience of this thought is dated by Nietzsche himself, in the posthumous fragments, to August 1881, at Sils-Maria. In Ecce Homo (1888), he wrote that the thought of the Eternal Return was the "fundamental conception" of Thus Spoke Zarathustra [2].

Several authors have pointed out other occurrences of this hypothesis in contemporary thought. Thus, the anthroposophist Rudolf Steiner, who revised the first catalogue of Nietzsche's personal library in January 1896, pointed out that Nietzsche would have read something similar in Eugen Dühring's Courses on philosophy (1875), which Nietzsche readily criticized. Lou Andreas-Salomé pointed out that Nietzsche referred to Ancient cyclical conceptions of time, in particular by the Pythagoreans, in the Inactual Considerations. Henri Lichtenberger and Charles Andler have pinpointed three works contemporary to Nietzsche which carried on the same hypothesis: J.G. Vogt, Die Kraft. Eine real-monistische Weltanschauung (1878), Auguste Blanqui, L'éternité par les astres (1872) and Gustave Le Bon, L'homme et les sociétés (1881). However, Gustave Le Bon is not quoted anywhere in Nietzsche's manuscripts; and Auguste Blanqui was named only in 1883. But Vogt's work, on the other hand, was read by Nietzsche precisely during this summer of 1881 in Sils-Maria [3]. Blanqui is mentionned by Albert Lange in his Geschichte des Materialismus (History of Materialism), a book closely read by Nietzsche [4].

Despite his reading of Vogt, Nietzche's conception of the eternal recurrence of all things differs from other seemingly similar hypotheses, insofar as it is intrinsically related to Zarathustra's announcement of the Übermensch and the ethical imperative of overcoming nihilism [5] On a few occasions in his notebooks, Nietzsche discusses the possibility of eternal recurrence as cosmological truth, but in the works he prepared for publication it is treated as the ultimate method of affirmation. According to Nietzsche, it would require a sincere amor fati (Love of Fate) not simply to endure, but to wish for, the eternal recurrence of all events exactly as they occurred — all the pain and joy, the embarrassment and glory.

Nietzsche calls the idea "horrifying and paralyzing," and says that its burden is the "heaviest weight" ("das schwerste Gewicht") imaginable. The wish for the eternal return of all events would mark the ultimate affirmation of life:

What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: 'This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more' ... Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: 'You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine.' [The Gay Science, §341]

As described by Nietzsche, the thought of eternal return is more than merely an intellectual concept or challenge, it is akin to a koan, or psychological device that occupies one's entire consciousness, stimulating a transformation of consciousness known as metanoia.

In Nietzsche scholarship, the cosmological hypothesis of eternal recurrence is of extreme interest, being a crucial axiom of his philosophy. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part III, chap. 2, #2, "Of the Vision and the Riddle" (German; also called "The Vision and the Enigma," part XLVI in the Dover Thrift Translation) Nietzsche confronts his aforementioned inner demon and proves to him the reality of eternal recurrence, and this leads to a self-awakening in which the demon is exorcised. Nietzsche also described himself as "the bringer of eternal recurrence" in Twilight of the Idols. Much effort is still expended in attempts to understand Nietzsche's notebooks' fragmentary mentions of eternal recurrence.

[Technologist]

To desire to do something differently would be to desire to be someone different. I am satisfied with who I am and what I am planning to become so I possess an attitude that affirms my "Being". I view my relative level of freedom as a product of restrictions (both internal and external) being imposed on me - on my ability to do what it is in my nature to do - minus my efforts to override these restrictions.

[Joesus]

I am satisfied with who I am and what I am planning to become

You mean who you are is presently acceptable but not enough to prevent you to desire to become something different.
The freedom to determine the extent of your own philosophy, definitions and satsifaction...

[OrionStyles]

Free Will requires that a volition is its own first cause. Now that's a tall order, and a position that I have never seen convincingly argued.*

I would argue that there is another case. To choose internally not to react to whatever external pattern rises up out of the muck.

Not even yes/no choices... simply an uncomplicated "no" would suffice.

[maximus242]

Max, chaotic systems will probably always be beyond the reach of complete predictability since you need infinite precision to model them and make predictions. This means that neural systems will very likely never be completely predictable (since they are chaotic systems).

Being inclined towards determinism since indeterminism usually implies ignorance of causes or in some cases, a giving up on trying to find the causes of things (i.e., by rationalizing that things are 'really' indeterministic or random, or simply the 'Will of God' without further inquiring into cause-effect relationships), I have nonetheless come across useful definitions of 'free will', or more precisely, 'freedom', in the deterministic sense, as the definition supplied by Spinoza. We are 'free' to the extent that we are the cause of our actions, and since we live in a completely deterministic universe, all of our causes are intertwined with others in a complex web of causality, where nothing is left to chance. Is this incompatible with quantum mechanics? No, though some might say that it depends on whether you accept the Copenhagen interpretation, where even though the evolution of the wavefunction is purely deterministic, the collapse results in a random selection of particle values, or Bohm's interpretation, where everything is deterministic, but at the expense of locality of interactions.

To make any sense of the world, it is necessary to adopt a deterministic worldview. People may disagree with me here, but I would justify it pragmatically; namely, that it is useful to believe that everything has causes and is deterministic because that opens the door for determining what those causes are and for further understanding, prediction, and control; the hallmarks of science. Thus, to speak of 'free will', I can accept no less than a deterministic definition for it, since anything else is likely a simple parroting of what others have told them (such as, 'free will' is the human freedom to choose), often employing definitions that are circular, inconsistent, vague, or otherwise unsatisfactory.

Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that deterministic definitions of 'free will', which I would subscribe to, are rather disingenuous since the term is usually understood by other people to mean some mysterious human freedom to make choices that apparently is not determined by prior causes; hence, confusion is wont to arise in any discussion of 'free will'. However, by being precise in what we are talking about, it is possible to avoid this, and so my question above, about what precisely is 'free will', was meant to bring a quick resolution to this unnecessarily messy topic.

Oh I agree that it is important to believe in a deterministic point of view regardless of whether or not there is a definitive free will. Dont get me wrong, I very much prefer to have free will, I was simply stating what the argument was against free will. We will have to see what level of predictability can be achieved in the coming years. Obviously if there is no random element to human consciousness then we face a doom of being a series of actions and reactions. Chaos mathematics may look unpredictable but underneath it lies a pattern of predictability and order. Again we are at the inital problem of whether or not their is any truely random occurances in the universe.

[Technologist]

Obviously if there is no random element to human consciousness then we face a doom of being a series of actions and reactions. Chaos mathematics may look unpredictable but underneath it lies a pattern of predictability and order. Again we are at the inital problem of whether or not their is any truely random occurances in the universe.

You do realize that randomness has nothing at all to do with the issue of FW, right?

[Technologist]

Here's an excellent review of the contemporary FW debate by a friend of mine. BTW, he's a hard determinist (so there are aspect of this paper which I disagree with).

*Who's Afraid of Creeping Exculpation?: The Costs of Hard Compatibilism and Benefits of Free Will Denial *

[Technologist]

And here is a truly awesome blog devoted to the FW debate.

*The Garden of Forking Paths*

[Lindsay]

Because I have a problem with accepting anything, except in theory, as absolutely so, I believe that my will is only relatively free at this point. However, the hope is that, as time goes by, and I become more and more in tune with the All--the physical, mental and spiritual ALL--my will will become more and more free in the exploration of the philosophies, the sciences and the arts, one of which is religion--one that is quite free from dogma and ritual and is based on ethical unitheism, or panentheism. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unitheism

[Hey Hey]

I can't recall if this has been included in the discussion already, but it might be fairly important to (re)consider:

What is/are the evolutionary benefit(s) of free-will? (And/or, if free-will was an "unplanned" emergent property, are there disadvantages, and might it be selected against in future?)

[lucid_dream]

Here's an excellent review of the contemporary FW debate by a friend of mine. BTW, he's a hard determinist (so there are aspect of this paper which I disagree with).

*Who's Afraid of Creeping Exculpation?: The Costs of Hard Compatibilism and Benefits of Free Will Denial *

This is an interesting article, but having scanned through it, I do not see the difference between a hard compatibilist and a free will denier since both accept (or to be more precise, in the case of compatibilism, is compatible with) determinism. Feel free to clarify this distinction. And what is a 'hard incompatibilist', which is a term used but never defined? Is it supposed to be identical to a free will denier? It seems to me that Hume's critique of causality is worth considering too, since any changes in our conception of causality will necessarily effect the meaning of determinism. For example, Hume's challenge that our notions of causality, far from being a 'necessary' connection between two events, are merely habits of the mind, something we do within our mind to connect disparate events into a seamless whole. This relates to free will because, if free will is an illusion and everything is strictly determined by cause-effect relationships, then it is worthwhile to examine more closely precisely what we mean by cause-effect relationships.

Consider Part II of Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding:

All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined but never connected. And as we can have no idea of anything, which never appears to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be, that we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasoning, or in private life.

I take this, and other of Hume's words, to mean that, even if cause-effect relationships are real, and even if determinism is true, then there's still the big problem that we can never infer new cause-effect relationships a priori because cause-effect relationships are discovered after the experience (or observation), from the conjunction of events. We never actually know the 'necessary connection' between cause and effect.

[Technologist]

This is an interesting article, but having scanned through it, I do not see the difference between a hard compatibilist and a free will denier since both accept (or to be more precise, in the case of compatibilism, is compatible with) determinism. Feel free to clarify this distinction. And what is a 'hard incompatibilist', which is a term used but never defined? Is it supposed to be identical to a free will denier?

The hard/soft distinction for compatibilism has become popular in the contemporary FW debate and revolves around the question of what would negate moral responsibility. A soft compatibilist believes that the nature of the casual forces (eg, an intelligent designer) that went into producing an agent are relevant, while a hard compatibilist does not. I am a hard compatibilist. From my POV the only two defensible positions are hard compatibilism and free will denial.

The difference between free will denial and compatibilism (as I subscribe to it) are, as Kip mentions, semantical disagreements over what constitutes “freedom� and “responsibility�.

The question which needs to be asked is why these semantical differences exist. Many free will deniers chalk the differences up to “semantical confusion� on the part of compatibilists. I beg to differ.

The epistemological commitments between the two camps are identical. Where they diverge is in their moral frameworks and the metaphysical/ontological commitments which they take on. I am a systems theorist who views systems (eg, a cognition) as having ontological significance. I am also holistic rather than reductionist. In contrast FW deniers view *intelligence* as a fundamental ontological entity, and they are also generally reductionist.

From my perspective, I can view the conception of FW, in the traditional Libertarian sense of the word, as being delusional. However, I view the actual sensation of FW (which we all experience) as having real significance in regards to the functional endurance of Being. Further, I believe that this sensation is a necessary component of Being, and one that can not (should not?) be eliminated.

As I’ve become accustom to at this point, FW deniers seem incapable of recognizing that there is a difference between morals and ethics. For example, I agree with Kip’s ethical proposals entirely, even those about constructive meta-controllers, but my morality leads me to a different interpretation of freedom and agency.

In many ways, the FW debate parallels the issue of “self� that is deconstructed by both eastern philosophy, and now modern functionalism as well. One could label the self as an illusion, but this implies a value judgement. It is just as reasonable for one to be totally aware of the nature of the “self systems� while still reaffirming its actuality.

[Lindsay]

I can't recall if this has been included in the discussion already, but it might be fairly important to (re)consider:

What is/are the evolutionary benefit(s) of free-will?

HH, to your first question I respond as follows: I feel that my free-will helps me be free to play a role in how I will to evolve--as a person or spiritual being--into the future. This is one of the reasons I hope that, because I am very, very curious, this will be so.

Also, I hope, and I believe as follows: I believe, without any proof, that my spiritual and personal being will survive the death of my brain. If it does not, no one will never know, including me. And, from the point of view of the now, what a pity this will be, don't you agree?
=============
BTW, put your second question in another way, please. :(And/or, if free-will was an "unplanned" emergent property, are there disadvantages, and might it be selected against in future?)

I simply do NOT understanding what you are asking.

[Hey Hey]

What is/are the evolutionary benefit(s) of free-will?

HH, to your first question I respond as follows: I feel that my free-will helps me be free to play a role in how I want to evolve, as a person or spiritual being, into the future. This is one of the reasons I hope that because I am very, very curious.

Also, I hope, and I believe, that my spiritual and personal being will survive the death of my brain. If it does not, I will never know. And, from the point of view of the now, what a pity this will be, don't you agree?

My question really requires an evidence-based biological answer, rather than a subjective individual "feeling" or "hope". Incidentally, I don't think it will be a big deal if our spiritual or "personal being" survives. We will leave our legacies (esp of discoveries and knowledge, sometimes formally recorded) and also leave room for the fresh intellect of the next independently minded generation.

What is/are the evolutionary benefit(s) of free-will? (And/or, if free-will was an "unplanned" emergent property, are there disadvantages, and might it be selected against in future?)

BTW, put your second question another way, please.

I simply do NOT understanding what you are asking.

This is a question of a biological kind. If free-will emerged as an extra (surprise, side-product) property of a brain that evolved for another purpose, then might this extra property possibly be disadvantageous for our future survival?

[Rick]

I must say that, out of all of the "pro-free will" perspectives expressed on this thread, Rick's is the one that I find most intriguing. For starters it actually makes an assertion about how free will is possible. Rick, would you say that your position is similar to the one Hofstadter's develops in GEB?

Thanks, Techno. While I am sure there are some similarities with Hofstadter's approach in GEB (which I read a few years ago), I am also influenced by Kurt Godel himself (incompleteness), Alan Turing (undecidability), and Rudy Rucker (with Stephen Wolfram (A New Kind of Science)) (automata and computational inteterminism).

I have scattered half a dozen or so various proofs of free will in places at this site. People advocating against free will here aren't really serious, in my opinion. They know we're free, but they like playing devil's advocate. The past cannot be reconstructed and the future cannot be predicted. Some people say they don't like the "impossible" word, but have they tried dividing by zero recently?

[Jellybean2]

Free will. I will subtract my religious thoughts and give my personal opinion.
(I know this won't be as "educated" definition as the ones above...but)Free will allows you to decided who you are and what you become regardless of situation and enviroment you are raised in. It takes strength and determination...but with the free will you can rise above what you have been around all your life and become someone great. Some people don't realize they have that power to overcome...from living in such tramatizing home enviroment....but deep down they have the strength and free will to overcome...

[Rick]

And I couldn't resist at least one Nietzsche reference for this dialog...

The thought of eternal recurrence

Nietzsche's doctrine was based on a fallacious belief that there is a finite number of possible states of the universe. However, just consider the number line from zero to one. We can visit an infinite number of locations on that segment and never visit the same place twice.

[Rick]

Can anyone provide a rigorous definition of "free will"? Anyone?

Nobody can. That's one of the problems with this ancient debate. Nobody can define free will or its opposite. Suppose the non-free will hypothesis is correct. Then there should be some scientific test for it that would end the debate. No such test can be devised. That is, the world with free will is indistinguishable from the world without free will. The debate is inherently pointless.

What non-free will would mean, if it were the case, would be that I could not assign blame for any actions or inactions of myself or others. That will never be the case, so non-free will loses. This should be the end of the argument.

[rhymer]

You are free to believe so, so I guess you must be right!
I also agree with you.